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1. Introduction: COVID-19-Nationalism and the resurgence 
of  borders 
When the first cases of  the new coronavirus infections started to appear outside 
of  China, in January 2020, COVID-19 was perceived to be a “rich man’s disease,” as 
it seemed to affect mostly wealthy travellers returning from business trips or short 
stays abroad for studies or tourism. It took no time for the virus to spread from 
the affluent to the poor, but the oddity of  facing a virus that apparently knew no 
social boundaries and spared no one led to the view that COVID-19 was “the great 
equalizer.”1 This assumption was soon proved wrong, as the virus and many of  the 
measures adopted to fight it were shown to disproportionately impact the poor and the 
most vulnerable – including racial/ethnic minorities, women, immigrants and asylum 
seekers2 –, contributing to the amplification of  existing socio-economic inequalities. 
Similarly, the expectation that the shared global experience3 of  the pandemic would 
inspire solidarity across class, race, religious and national divides also proved to be 
largely unfounded. Since the start of  the pandemic, there have been numerous reports 
of  racist and xenophobic incidents linked to COVID-19, first directed against Chinese 
nationals and people perceived as of  Asian origin, then extended to African migrants, 
asylum seekers, Muslims, Roma communities, and foreigners in general.4 As for the 
States, their immediate reaction was to close borders, adopt protectionist measures and 
compete against each other for medical supplies and personnel.5  
It would seem obvious that the global nature of  the COVID-19 pandemic 
requires international collaboration to mount an effective response, yet unilateralism 
and selfishness have been pervasive, prompting talk of  deglobalisation and raising 
concerns that the fight against the virus will revive and embolden nationalism in 
its ugliest forms. In their discussion of  the correlation between the pandemic and 
nationalism, Eric Taylor Woods et al. consider it likely that COVID-19 will work to erode 
global institutions and to strengthen the (powerful) Nation States, while contributing 
to the intensification of  existing ethnic and national cleavages.6 There is also fear that 
national governments might abuse emergency powers to increase control over their 
populations and to elude parliamentary and judicial oversight, and that the health 
1 See e.g. Stephen A. Mein, “COVID-19 and health disparities: The reality of  ‘the great equalizer’”, 
Journal of  General Internal Medicine, v. 35, no. 8 (August 2020): 2439-2440.
2 As pointed out by several international human rights agencies. See e.g. UN Committee on the 
Elimination of  Racial Discrimination, Statement on the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and its implications 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, August 7, 2020; 
UN Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women, Guidance Note on CEDAW 
and COVID-19, April 22, 2020; UN Committee on Migrant Workers and UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Human Rights of  Migrants, Joint Guidance Note on the Impacts of  the COVID-19 Pandemic on 
the Human Rights of  Migrants, May 26, 2020; all available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
Pages/COVID-19-and-TreatyBodies.aspx, accessed September 21, 2020. 
3 See Florian Bieber, “Global nationalism in times of  the COVID-19 pandemic”, Nationalities Papers 
(2020): 1.
4 See e.g. “Bulletin # 1 Coronavirus Pandemic in the EU: Fundamental Rights Implications”, FRA, 
April 2020, available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-coronavirus-
pandemic-eu-bulletin-1_en.pdf, accessed April 13, 2020.
5 See Peter Goodman et al., “A new front for nationalism: the global battle against a virus”, The 
New York Times, April 10, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/
coronavirus-vaccine-nationalism.html, accessed April 11, 2020.  
6 See Eric Taylor Woods et al., “COVID-19, nationalism, and the politics of  crisis: A scholarly 
exchange”, Nations and Nationalism (2020): 3. 
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crisis will contribute to accelerate the backslide of  democracies into authoritarianism.7 
States are certainly centre-stage in the “war” against the virus and, in their defence of  
national interest/security, have been able to restrict individual liberty and privacy in 
unprecedented ways. 
There is no clearer sign of  the return to the State than the resurgence of  national 
borders. When it was announced that we were facing a global pandemic, States all 
over the world rushed to close their borders and impose sweeping travel restrictions, 
with some adopting blatantly discriminatory practices, such as barring access to 
foreigners solely on the basis of  their nationality and irrespective of  whether or not 
they had been physically present in a region affected by the virus.8 Even when based 
on place of  departure, travel bans are known to be mostly “security theatre”, since 
they are ultimately ineffective in blocking the spread of  the virus,9 but their political 
appeal is enormous and they have been used widely. It may be said that, by rushing 
to close borders, States were first and foremost seeking to fulfil their obligation to 
protect the lives and health of  their populations. It is clear however that many national 
governments seized the opportunity offered by the virus scare to push their anti-
immigration agendas and regain border control. Good or bad intentions aside, the 
fact is that the travel restrictions imposed to address COVID-19 have had profound 
implications for the lives of  millions of  people and, as discussed in the next section, 
their compliance with international human rights law is much disputed, even if  States 
enjoy ample prerogatives to control who enters their territories.  
 
2. Travel restrictions and international human rights law
States’ entitlement to control immigration, while challenged for many decades 
and from many quarters, is still generally recognised in the practice of  the international 
system.10 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not 
recognise the right of  aliens to enter or reside in the territory of  a State party. Under 
Article 12 of  the Covenant, liberty of  movement is only recognised to those who 
are already lawfully within the territory of  a State, and States are free to establish the 
criteria for lawful admission. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has held that there may be circumstances 
in which an alien may enjoy the protection of  the Covenant in relation to entry into 
a territory, as will be the case for instance when considerations of  non-discrimination 
arise.11 Travel bans based solely on nationality, as those reported in Hungary and Iraq 
for example, may well be a case in point. Also problematic in light of  Article 12 is the 
refusal to admit foreigners who are legal residents in the country, as was reported to 
7 See Yvonne Tew, “Constitutionalism in the time of  corona”, International Journal of  Constitutional 
Law Blog, June 10, 2020, available at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/06/constitutionalism-in-
the-time-of-corona/, accessed June 11, 2020.  
8 That was the case with Hungary and Iraq, among others. See Jelena Dzankic and Lorenzo Piccoli, 
“Coronavirus: Citizenship infected”, GlobalCIT blog, March 13, 2020, available at https://globalcit.eu/
coronavirus-citizenship-infected/, accessed September 23, 2020.
9 See Yasmeen Serhan and Timothy McLaughlin, “The other problematic outbreak”, The Atlantic, 
March 13, 2020, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/
coronavirus-covid19-xenophobia-racism/607816/, accessed April 13, 2020.
10 See Joseph H. Carens, “Who should get in? The ethics of  immigration admissions”, Ethics & 
International Affairs, v. 17, no. 1 (April 2003): 1.
11 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 15: The Position of  Aliens under the Covenant, 
1986, § 5, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139acfc.pdf, accessed April 14, 2020.
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happen in Ecuador and Guatemala, and the refusal to allow anyone (foreigners and 
nationals alike) to leave the country, as reported in Namibia and the Czech Republic.12 
Both the right to liberty of  movement and the right to leave the country can be 
restricted by States, under Article 12(3), provided that restrictions are prescribed by law, 
are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of  others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the 
Covenant, i.e. that they meet the requirements of  legality, necessity and proportionality.13 
States are only obliged to admit their own nationals, per Article 12(4) of  the Covenant, 
an obligation arguably breached by Cyprus when it barred entry to its own nationals 
returning from hotspots abroad in the first days of  the outbreak,14 and by Namibia 
when it made admission of  its own nationals conditional on their performing missions 
that were critical to national interest.15 It should be pointed out however that Article 
12(4) uses the qualifier “arbitrarily” – “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of  the right to enter 
his own country” –, which suggests that there may be instances in which even nationals 
may be lawfully barred at the border, a possibility that the Human Rights Committee 
considers unlikely but does not dismiss entirely.16  
This means that – outside of  the cases of  blatant discrimination and 
disproportionality – the travel restrictions imposed to address the COVID-19 health 
crisis may well be able to pass muster if  brought to the attention of  the Human Rights 
Committee by interstate or individual communications under the relevant provisions 
of  the Covenant and its Optional Protocol. Several States party to the Covenant have 
nevertheless opted to pre-empt any future reprimands and used their prerogative under 
Article 4 to notify the UN Secretary-General that they were temporarily derogating 
from their obligations under Article 12, among other provisions of  the Covenant.17 
The move by States to derogate from their international human rights obligations in 
times of  crisis may be seen as ominous, but it has been lauded as an act of  transparency 
and as a safeguard against the risk of  normalising the exceptional.18 In April 2020, the 
Human Rights Committee called on all States which had taken emergency measures 
in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic to notify the Secretary-General of  the 
derogations without delay.19 Invoking Article 4 does not give States carte blanche to do as 
they please There are a number of  requirements to be met: (a) there must be an official 
proclamation of  a state of  emergency; (b) the Secretary-General must be notified and 
12 Andrea Salcedo, Sanam Yar and Gina Cherelus, “Coronavirus travel restrictions, across the globe”, 
The New York Times, July 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-travel-restrictions.
html, accessed September 24, 2020.
13 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 27: Freedom of  Movement (Article 12), 1999, 
§§ 13-15, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf, accessed September 24, 2020.
14 See Cyprus’ Country Report for FRA’s comparative study on the Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak 
in the EU, pp. 5-6, available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/cyprus-report-
covid-19-april-2020_en.pdf, accessed April 14, 2020.
15 Andrea Salcedo, Sanam Yar and Gina Cherelus, “Coronavirus travel restrictions”.
16 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 27, § 21.
17 At time of  writing, these are: Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Palestine, Peru, Romania, 
San Marino, and Thailand. Information available at https://datastudio.google.com/u/0/
reporting/1sHT8quopdfavCvSDk7t-zvqKIS0Ljiu0/page/dHMKB, accessed September 24, 2020.  
18 See e.g. Giulia Borgna, “Uncharted waters: Navigating through extradition proceedings in the face 
of  the coronavirus pandemic”, Giurisprudenza Penale, no. 5 (2020): 15.
19 Human Rights Committee, Statement on derogations from the Covenant in connection with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, CCPR/C/128/2, April 30, 2020, § 1, available at https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/COVIDstatementEN.pdf, accessed September 24, 2020. 
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provided full information about the derogating measures taken and a clear explanation 
of  the reasons for taking them; (c) the derogations must be strictly necessary and 
proportional, i.e. limited in duration, geographical coverage and material scope, as far 
as possible; (d) the measures taken must be in conformity with other international 
obligations; (e) the measures taken must not involve discrimination on the grounds 
of  race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin; and (f) certain non-derogable 
rights, such as the right to life and the prohibition of  torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, are off  limits. It is worth noting that, while Article 
12 was the provision that States consistently included in their derogation notices, the 
Human Rights Committee does not consider it necessary to derogate from it, since this 
provision already allows restrictions. The Committee actually advises States that they 
should not derogate from Covenant rights or rely on a derogation made when they 
are able to attain their public health or other public policy objectives by invoking the 
possibility to restrict certain rights, such as Article 12.20
If  we move from the UN to the Council of  Europe framework, the picture will 
not change dramatically, even though some of  the rights have more bite and there 
are some promising developments in the case law of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights. Like the UN Covenant, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and its Protocols do not recognise the right of  aliens to enter or reside in the territory 
of  a State party, and expressly allow restrictions to the freedom of  movement of  
those lawfully within the territory of  a State for the protection of  health [Article 2 
(3) of  Protocol No. 4]. However, State nationals enjoy a stronger right of  admission, 
since Article 3 of  Protocol No. 4 prescribes that no one shall be expelled from the 
territory of  the State of  which he is a national nor be deprived of  the right to enter the 
territory of  that State, and foreigners benefit from the explicit prohibition of  collective 
expulsions (Article 4 of  Protocol No. 4). 
The European Court of  Human Rights, in spite of  its frequent reminders that 
States have the right to control entry, residence and expulsion of  non-nationals,21 
has come to set some limits on this right, by holding States responsible when their 
decisions to refuse entry or to expel foreigners are deemed to place foreigners at risk 
of  being killed or subject to torture (in breach of  Articles 2 and 3 of  the Convention) 
or hinder the foreigners’ right to private and/or family life (in breach of  Article 8).22 
The Court has also been critical of  push-backs at sea, having held Italy responsible for 
breach of  Article 3 of  the Convention and Article 4 of  Protocol No. 4, after the Italian 
coastguard summarily returned a group of  about 200 migrants to Libya without giving 
them the opportunity to apply for asylum.23 
Presumably to prevent equally severe assessments of  their emergency measures, a 
few States – Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Macedonia, Romania, 
San Marino and Serbia – made use of  the derogation clause in Article 15 of  the ECHR, 
which has a similar wording to that of  Article 4 of  the UN Covenant mentioned 
earlier.24 Except for Georgia and Serbia, all States have in the meantime withdrawn their 
20 Human Rights Committee, Statement on derogations, § 2.
21 See e.g. Moustaquim v. Belgium, no. 12313/86, § 43, February 18, 1991.
22 See e.g. Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, October 12, 2006; Sharifi and 
Others v. Italy and Greece, no. 16643/09, October 21, 2014; M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, no. 59793/17, 
December 11, 2018.
23 See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, February 23, 2012.
24 There must be a public emergency threatening the life of  the nation; the measures derogating from 
Convention obligations must be limited to what is strictly required by the exigencies of  the situation; 
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derogations.25 The Court retains, in any case, the power to assess if  the States complied 
with the requirements of  Article 15, namely whether the emergency measures adopted 
to address the pandemic were strictly required by the exigencies of  the situation.26
It will take some time before we have a ruling from the Court on any of  the 
measures being taken in the context of  the COVID-19 pandemic.27 The Court rejected 
a request filed by Maltese NGO Repubblika for an interim measure, under Article 
39 of  the Rules of  the Court, consisting of  ordering that the Maltese and the Italian 
Governments “reverse their declarations to the effect that their ports are closed/or their countries 
not places of  safety, thus preventing the rescue and disembarkation of  immigrants at sea due to 
Covid-19 circumstances.”28 Nothing very surprising given the Court’s parsimonious use 
of  interim measures.29 Meanwhile, the Court is looking into the risk of  infection by 
the new coronavirus in the case of  Hafeez v. the United Kingdom,30 which concerns the 
extradition to the United States of  a sixty-year-old man with several health issues. In 
its communication of  the application, the Court asked the UK Government whether, 
having particular regard to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, there would be a real risk 
of  a breach of  Article 3 of  the ECHR if  the applicant were to be extradited, given the 
conditions of  detention he would face on arrival. Mutatis mutandis, the same can come 
to be asked about the health risks incurred by individuals as a consequence of  a State’s 
decision to deport them to a coronavirus hotspot. The Court’s assessment of  whether 
the risk of  infection amounts to ill-treatment for purposes of  Article 3 of  the ECHR 
will very much depend on the evolution of  the epidemiologic situation in the country 
where the applicant is sent to, which can change very rapidly and be unforeseeable by 
States’ authorities at the time of  the decision to extradite or to expel.31 It is not unlikely 
that the Court will be amenable to the States’ arguments that they did the best that they 
could to fulfil their Convention obligations under these most trying circumstances. 
Strict scrutiny of  the necessity and proportionality of  the measures taken by States 
to contain the virus, while required in theory, will prove difficult in practice, given 
the unprecedented scale and severity of  the health crisis, and the ongoing scientific 
the measures must not be inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under international law; no 
derogation is allowed for Articles 2 (except for deaths resulting from lawful acts of  war), 3, 4(1) and 7; 
States must keep the Secretary General fully informed of  the measures taken and the reasons therefor, 
as well as of  when the measures cease to operate. 
25 Information available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/trea-
ty/005/declarations, accessed September 25, 2020.
26 See Giulia Borgna, “Uncharted waters”, 15. 
27 The estimate making the rounds points to five or six years. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “COVID-19 
and the European Convention on Human Rights”, Strasbourg Observers blog, March 27, 2020, available 
at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/03/27/covid-19-and-the-european-convention-on-human-
rights/, accessed September 17, 2020.  
28 As pointed out by the Prime Minister of  Malta, Robert Abela, in his exchange of  May 2020 with the 
Council of  Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, a propos Malta’s handling of  the situation of  
migrants in distress at sea. The exchange is available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/
commissioner-urges-malta-to-meet-its-obligations-to-save-lives-at-sea-ensure-prompt-and-safe-
disembarkation-and-investigate-allegations-of-delay-or-no, accessed September 24, 2020.  
29 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “What can the European Court of  Human Rights do in the 
time of  crisis?”, Strasbourg Observers blog, April 14, 2020, available at https://strasbourgobservers.
com/2020/04/14/what-can-the-european-court-of-human-rights-do-in-the-time-of-crisis/, 
accessed September 24, 2020.
30 Application no. 14198/20, lodged on March 19, 2020. Information available at https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-202335%22]}, accessed September 24, 2020.
31 See Giulia Borgna, “Uncharted waters”, 9. 
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uncertainty as to the most effective ways to handle it. This does not mean, of  course, 
that all bets are off. As noted by Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, while the emergency may 
be able to justify many things and even lead to a decrease in the level of  protection 
afforded by the ECHR, it will not justify just anything.32 In what concerns mobility 
rights, there can certainly be no justification for collective expulsions, for the disregard 
of  the principle of  non-refoulement or for blatantly discriminatory restrictions to freedom 
of  movement (e.g. on the basis of  race, colour, national origin or association with a 
national minority).
3. Travel restrictions at internal and external borders in the 
European Union 
The States’ rush to barricade themselves behind national borders was particularly 
disheartening in the European Union, given that freedom of  movement has been at 
the centre of  the European integration project from the very start and that the lifting 
of  internal border controls in the Schengen Area has been heralded as one of  the 
bloc’s greatest achievements. Intra-European solidarity was nowhere in sight when, 
starting on March 11, 2020, Austria and other Schengen States unilaterally reintroduced 
border controls at their land and air borders, in rapid succession,33 leaving many EU 
citizens stranded after being denied admission in Italy, Hungary, Croatia and the Czech 
Republic, to name a few.34 The European Commission’s initial response was hesitant, 
and when it finally stepped up with a plan to ensure a coordinated approach at EU level, 
not only did it not challenge the Member States’ justification for reintroducing internal 
borders, but it used the same public health rationale (i.e. slow down the spread of  the 
virus and respond to healthcare needs) to argue for the need to impose restrictions 
at Schengen external borders, by recommending that the Schengen Member States 
and Associated States should adopt a coordinated decision to impose a temporary 
restriction on non-essential travel from third countries into the EU+ area, for an initial 
period of  30 days;35 a plan endorsed by the European Council, on March 17, 2020.
32 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “COVID-19 and the European Convention on Human Rights”.
33 By the end of  March, fifteen Schengen States had reintroduced border checks at their national 
borders. These were: Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, 
Poland, Germany, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Estonia, Belgian, France. For a detailed chronology, see 
Sergio Carrera and Ngo Chun Luk, “Love thy neighbour? Coronavirus politics and their impact on 
EU freedoms and rule of  law in the Schengen Area”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 
2020-04 (April 2020): 3-5.
34 “Schengen Area in the brink of  suspension: what could be the consequences”, Schengenvisainfo, 
March 25, 2020, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/schengen-area-in-the-brink-of-suspen-
sion-what-could-be-the-consequences/, accessed April 14, 2020.
35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council COVID-19: Temporary Restriction on Non-Essential Travel to the EU, COM(2020) 115 final, 
16.3.2020. The 30-days period was first extended until May 15 [Communication from the Commission 
on the assessment of  the application of  the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, 
COM(2020) 148 final, 8.4.2020], and later until June 15 [Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on the second assessment of  the application 
of  the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, COM(2020) 222 final, 8.5.2020] and June 
30 [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council on the third assessment of  the application of  the temporary restriction on non-essential 
travel to the EU, COM(2020) 399 final, 11.6.2020]. In its June 11 communication, the Commission put 
forward an approach for a gradual and coordinated phasing out of  the travel restrictions at Schengen 
external borders and invited the Council to act with a view to the adoption of  a concrete coordinated 
approach on the list of  countries for which travel restrictions could be lifted as of  July 1st, 2020. On June 
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EU law sets the most far reaching limitations on the right of  States to control their 
borders, but even here, States retain the prerogative to bar access to their territories on 
a number of  grounds. The temporary reintroduction of  border controls at internal 
borders is allowed by Articles 25 and ff. of  the Schengen Borders Code,36 and the 
restriction of  freedom of  movement of  EU citizens from other Member States is 
allowed by Articles 27 and ff. of  Directive 2004/38/EC.37 
Both the Code and the Directive phrase their provisions narrowly. The 
reintroduction of  internal borders is a measure of  last resort, for exceptional 
circumstances when there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security. It 
must be of  short duration (although it can extend up to two years)38 and be limited 
to what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat. The assessment of  
the proportionality of  the measure in relation to the threat must consider inter alia 
the likely impact of  the measure on free movement of  persons within the area. 
The restriction of  the freedom of  movement of  Union citizens is only possible on 
grounds of  public policy, public security, or public health. For the restriction to be 
imposed on the first two grounds, the individual concerned must represent a genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of  the fundamental interests of  
society, and the restriction must comply with the principle of  proportionality. For the 
restriction to be imposed on public health grounds, it is necessary that the disease 
justifying it has epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of  the 
WHO or is an infectious disease or a contagious parasitic disease which is the subject 
of  protection provisions applying to nationals of  the host Member State.39 Even 
though the treatment of  the health crisis as an internal security threat is contested,40 
the magnitude of  the COVID-19 pandemic is such that EU Member States will likely 
have no trouble in making a case for the necessity of  their restrictive border measures. 
Less straightforward will be to assess whether these measures are proportionate, 
given the evolving and sometimes conflicting medical evidence about the best way 
30, the Council adopted the Recommendation on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into 
the EU and the possible lifting of  such restriction, 2020/0134(NLE), which indicated that the list of  
third-countries for which restrictions were lifted would be revised every two weeks.
36 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  9 March 2016 on 
a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of  persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016.
37 Directive 2004/38/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004 on the 
right of  citizens of  the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of  the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) no. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/
EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/
EEC and 93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 158, 30.4.2004.
38 Some last even longer, in clear breach of  the Schengen Borders Code, as noted by Alena Kuzko, 
referring to the introduction of  internal borders by Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, France and 
Norway, following the 2015 migration crisis. See Alena Kudzko, “Return to borderless Europe after 
COVID-19 will be difficult but not impossible”, EURACTIVE, March 31, 2020, available at https://
www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/return-to-borderless-europe-after-covid-19-will-be-
difficult-but-not-impossible/, accessed April 13, 2020.  
39 A similar definition of  “threat to public health” is provided in the Schengen Borders Code [Article 
2(21)], which allows/requires States to bar entry at external borders to third-country nationals who 
are considered to be a threat to public health [Article 6(1)(e)].
40 See Sergio Carrera and Ngo Chun Luk, “Love thy neighbour?”, 27. In the Guidelines adopted by 
the Commission on March 16, 2020, it is allowed that, in an extremely critical situation, a Member 
State can identify a need to reintroduce border controls as a reaction to the risk posed by a contagious 
disease. COVID-19 Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the 
availability of  goods and essential services, C(2020) 1753 final, 16.3.2020.
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to handle the disease. States will no doubt argue that even their most restrictive 
measures were proportionate the scientific knowledge available at the time they were 
enacted. As noted in the previous section, save for blatantly disproportionate and 
discriminatory measures, or measures in breach of  unequivocal provisions of  EU 
law, such as the prohibition of  non-refoulement,41 EU Member States will likely be able 
to justify much of  what they have been doing in their fight against the pandemic.
Since its first communication on the topic, the European Commission has tried 
to curb the Member States’ worst impulses, calling on them to comply with key tenets 
of  EU law, such as ensuring mobility rights for EU citizens, respecting the principle 
of  non-refoulement, and ensuring that restrictive border measures are necessary, 
proportional and non-discriminatory. The Commission’s approach has been criticised 
for being too soft on States and ineffective in restoring freedom of  movement in the 
Schengen Area,42 but, on a counterfactual note, it can be argued that Member States 
would probably have gone even further in their restrictive measures if  it were not for 
the Commission’s nudging. The Commission took upon itself  the task to monitor the 
Member States’ compliance with the principle of  proportionality and to intervene 
to request the lifting of  the measures considered disproportionate, especially when 
they have an impact on the Single Market.43 In the guidelines issued on March 16, 
2020, the Commission explained that a decision to refuse entry at Schengen external 
borders would only be proportionate if  taken following consultation of  the health 
authorities and considered by them as suitable and necessary to attain the public health 
objective.44 In its communication of  September 4, 2020, the Commission noted that 
the principle of  proportionality required that any limitations to EU citizens’ right to 
free movement must be necessary and genuinely meet objectives of  general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedom of  others.45
The trail of  Commission communications over the past seven months provides 
some insight into what the main concerns and difficulties on the ground have been. 
One is to ensure admission at Schengen external borders to nationals of  all EU 
Member States and Schengen Associated States, and their family members, as well 
as of  third-country nationals who are long-term residents under the Long-Term 
Residence Directives and persons deriving their right to reside from other EU 
Directives or national law, or who hold long-term visas. Initially, States were only 
asked to admit travellers returning to their homes,46 but the Commission has in the 
41 Article 78(1) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the EU and Article 19(2) of  the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights.
42 At the time of  writing, Finland, Hungary, Denmark and Norway have not yet lifted controls at their 
internal borders and the related travel restrictions due to COVID-19, while Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden maintain controls at their internal borders due to other causes, mostly 
terrorism threats. Information available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/
borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en, accessed September 28, 2020. For 
a scathing criticism of  the Commission’s mimicry of  the States’ health scare rationale for closing 
borders, see Sergio Carrera and Ngo Chun Luk, “Love thy neighbour?”, 17-19.  
43 Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures (2020/C 126/01), 
17.04.2020.
44 COVID-19 Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability 
of  goods and essential services, C(2020) 1753 final, 16.3.2020.
45 Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a coordinated approach to the restriction of  free 
movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, COM(2020) 499 final, 4.9.2020.
46 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council COVID-19: Temporary Restriction on Non-Essential Travel to the EU, COM(2020) 
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meantime recommended that these travellers be allowed to travel to the EU+ area 
for any purpose.47 Another major concern is to ensure that the travel restrictions 
at Schengen external borders do not apply to third country nationals who perform 
an essential function (e.g. frontier workers, transport personnel, seasonal workers 
in agriculture) or who are in need of  international protection.48 Another is to 
ensure that any decision on refusal of  entry to third-country nationals is, not only 
proportionate and non-discriminatory, but also implemented in a way that ensures 
full respect of  the human dignity of  the persons concerned, besides complying with 
the special provisions on the right to asylum and international protection or the 
issue of  long-term visas.49 Also, to ensure that when deciding whether the temporary 
restriction on non-essential travel to the EU applies to a third-country national, 
residence in a third country for which the restrictions on non-essential travel have 
115 final, 16.3.2020. According to the guidelines published by the Commission on the same day, 
this means that the Member States must always admit their own citizens and residents, and facilitate 
transit of  other EU citizens and residents who are returning home. COVID-19 Guidelines for border 
management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of  goods and essential services, 
C(2020) 1753 final, 16.3.2020.
47 Possibly subject to health requirements, such as self-isolation. Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on the third assessment of  the 
application of  the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, COM(2020) 399 final, 
11.6.2020.
48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council COVID-19: Temporary Restriction on Non-Essential Travel to the EU, COM(2020) 115 final, 
16.3.2020. The need to ensure the free movement of  transport workers, irrespective of  nationality 
and place of  residence, was further stressed by the Commission in its Communication on the 
implementation of  the Green Lanes under the Guidelines for border management measures to protect 
health and ensure the availability of  goods and essential services, COM(2020) 1897 final, 23.3.2020. The 
case of  cross-border and seasonal workers was dealt with in the Communication from the Commission 
Guidelines concerning the exercise of  the free movement of  workers during COVID-19 outbreak, 
C(2020) 2051 final, 30.3.2020, and later in the Communication from the Commission Guidelines on 
seasonal workers in the EU in the context of  the COVID-19 outbreak, C(2020) 4813 final, 16.7.2020. 
The case of  seafarers was dealt with in the Communication from the Commission Guidelines on 
protection of  health, repatriation and travel arrangements for seafarers, passengers and other persons 
on board ships, C(2020) 3100 final, 8.4.2020. On May 13, 2020, the Commission returned to the case 
of  essential workers, noting that significant problems still remain for the crossing of  certain internal 
borders and calling on Member States to allow workers, in particular transport, frontier, posted and 
seasonal workers, and service providers to cross borders and have unhindered access to their place of  
work. Communication from the Commission COVID-19 Towards a phased and coordinated approach 
for restoring freedom of  movement and lifting internal border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13.05.2020. 
On June 11, the Commission recommended that the list of  travellers with an essential function extended 
to include also people travelling for the purpose of  study and highly qualified third-country workers if  
their employment is necessary from an economic perspective and the work cannot be postponed or 
performed abroad. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council on the third assessment of  the application of  the temporary restriction on non-
essential travel to the EU, COM(2020) 399 final, 11.6.2020.
49 Communication from the Commission COVID-19 Guidance on the implementation of  the 
temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of  transit arrangements for 
the repatriation of  EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy, C(2020) 2050 final, 30.3.2020. On 
April 17, 2020, the Commission issued separate guidelines on asylum, stressing the need to ensure 
that access to the asylum procedure continues to the greatest extent possible during the COVID-19 
pandemic, and encouraging States to resume transfers, resettlement-related activities and return 
procedures as soon as practically possible in view of  the evolving circumstances. Communication 
from the Commission COVID-19: Guidance on the implementation of  relevant EU provisions in the 
area of  asylum and return procedures and on resettlement, C(2020) 2516 final, 17.4.2020.
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been lifted should be the deciding factor, and not nationality.50 To ensure that the 
visa holders who are unable to leave the territory due to travel restrictions are not 
penalised for overstaying their visas, with the Commission recommending that States 
issue them with long-stay visas or with temporary residence permits, and that they 
waive administrative sanctions or penalties on individuals in those circumstances.51 
To ensure that EU citizens stranded in Member States other than their State of  
nationality, in third countries or on the High Seas, and their family members, are able 
to return home – if  necessary, with the repatriation assistance of  the Commission, 
the European External Action Service and the EU Delegation in the third country – 
and that Member States facilitate their onward transit by any means of  transportation 
available.52 To ensure that the absence of  the necessary visas or the expiry of  travel 
documents does not hinder the disembarkation of  third-country nationals on 
humanitarian grounds and to facilitate repatriation, nor the right of  EU citizens to 
enter the territory of  a Member State different from that of  their nationality.53 To 
ensure that travel restrictions and border controls are lifted once the border regions’ 
epidemiological situation converges sufficiently and social distancing rules are widely 
and responsibly applied, and that the gradual re-opening of  borders gives priority to 
cross-border and seasonal workers and avoids any discrimination against EU mobile 
workers.54 
4. Conclusion: the perks of  being an EU citizen
European Union citizenship does not bestow an abundance of  rights upon its 
holders, but it grants them the fundamental right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of  the Member States [Article 45(1) of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights]. As noted earlier, this right may be restricted on public health grounds under 
Articles 27 to 29 of  Directive 2004/38/EC, and Member States have been making 
ample use of  this possibility in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. When Italy 
became the epicentre of  the outbreak in early March 2020, the sudden and unilateral 
50 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council on the third assessment of  the application of  the temporary restriction on non-essential 
travel to the EU, COM(2020) 399 final, 11.6.2020.
51 Communication from the Commission COVID-19 Guidance on the implementation of  the 
temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of  transit arrangements 
for the repatriation of  EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy, C(2020) 2050 final, 30.3.2020.   
52 Communication from the Commission COVID-19 Guidance on the implementation of  the 
temporary restriction on non-essential travel to the EU, on the facilitation of  transit arrangements 
for the repatriation of  EU citizens, and on the effects on visa policy, C(2020) 2050 final, 30.3.2020. 
In its Communication of  March 23, 2020, on the implementation of  green lanes, the Commission 
had already urged Member States to set up safe passage transit corridors for all EU citizens being 
repatriated, regardless of  their nationality, and to ensure that they have at least one airport functional 
for repatriation and international relief  flights. The repatriation and travel arrangements for seafarers, 
passengers and other persons on board ships were the object of  the Communication from the 
Commission Guidelines on protection of  health, repatriation and travel arrangements for seafarers, 
passengers and other persons on board ships, C(2020) 3100 final, 8.4.2020.
53 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on protection of  health, repatriation and travel 
arrangements for seafarers, passengers and other persons on board ships, C(2020) 3100 final, 8.4.2020.
54 Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures (2020/C 126/01), 
17.04.2020. The need to ensure proportionality and non-discrimination among EU citizens when 
lifting internal borders was reiterated in the Communication from the Commission COVID-19 
Towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of  movement and lifting internal 
border controls, C(2020) 3250 final, 13.05.2020.
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reintroduction of  border controls within the Schengen Area left many EU citizens 
stranded, barred from accessing their places of  work and/or residence. Restoration 
of  freedom of  movement within the Schengen Area and protection of  EU citizens’ 
mobility rights have been a top priority for the European Commission, since its first 
communication on travel restrictions in the context of  the COVID-19 pandemic, 
of  March 16, 2020, even though the primary goal was to prevent the knock-on 
effects of  the mobility restrictions on the Internal Market. Frequent reminders by 
the Commission of  the need to ensure that EU citizens are not discriminated against 
on the basis of  their nationality and that they are not hindered by disproportionately 
restrictive measures suggest that EU citizens (in particular cross-border and seasonal 
workers)55 are still facing serious travel restrictions and discriminatory treatment on 
the ground. With Member States’ nationalistic responses, it is national citizenship – 
not EU citizenship – that secures individuals’ admission to the territory, even if  there 
have been cases – blatantly illegal vis-à-vis the ECHR and EU law – of  EU Member 
States (e.g. Cyprus) barring admission to their own nationals.
Where the perks of  EU citizenship really showed was in the repatriation from 
third countries, where EU citizens were able to benefit from the diplomatic and 
consular protection of  Member States other than their State of  nationality, under 
Article 46 of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights. The joint action of  the 
Commission and the Member States in securing assistance and consular repatriation 
operations to EU citizens stranded in third-countries allowed thousands to return 
home56 and demonstrated how a key entitlement of  EU citizenship can be put into 
effect at crucial junctures. An arguable silver lining in this whole nightmarish process. 
55 See Communication from the Commission Guidelines on seasonal workers in the EU in the context 
of  the COVID-19 outbreak, C(2020) 4813 final, 16.7.2020.
56 Detailed information on repatriation operations by country is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/76203/good-stories-consular-support-eu-citizens-stranded-
abroad_en, accessed April 15, 2020.
